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I. INTRODUCTION
In November 1994, Nevada attorneys learned that the State Bar
of Nevada (SBN) Board of Governors was preparing to petition the
state supreme court to institute an additional condition of licensure:
twenty hours of pro bono publico service per year.' This petition
would make Nevada the first state to propose a mandatory pro bono
program. But few of the SBN's approximately 3500 active members
had been consulted about the mandatory pro bono petition.3 The
backlash was swift.
1. Margo Piscevich, A View from the Top, NEv. LAW., Nov. 1994, at 2,4 [hereinafter
Piscevich, Nov. 1994]. The requirement would apply to all active resident SBN members.
Petition at 4, In re Amendment to the Supreme Court Rules Mandating that Attorneys
Licensed to Practice in the State of Nevada Shall Perform Certain Hours of Pro Bono
Publico (Nev. 1994) (ADKT 200) [hereinafter Nevada Petition].
Pro bono publico is defined as service provided for the public good. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990). The phrase has been interpreted to convey the "larger
good and meaning of providing one-to-one legal services to persons in need, including the
needy working poor, who constitute such a large and permanent part of society." Joseph
W. Bellacosa, Obligatory Pro Bono Publico Legal Services: Mandatory or Voluntary?
Distinction Without a Difference?, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745,747 (1991). However, other
legal work also has been labeled as pro bono, including unpaid legal work for local charity
organizations or for attorneys' friends and family. Chesterfield H. Smith, A Mandatory
Pro Bono Service Standard-Its Time Has Come, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 727, 730 (1981).
Pro bono services are especially necessary in civil cases because the constitutionally
guaranteed right to assignment of counsel only extends to criminal cases. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. In addition, low- and moderate-income communities need pro bono legal-
related assistance in matters outside the courtroom, including administrative actions,
alternative dispute resolution, and tax preparation. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Rethinking "The Practice of Law", 41 EMORY L.J. 451, 460 (1992); Roger C. Cramton,
Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1125 (1991).
2. Piscevich, Nov. 1994, supra note 1, at 4; Richard B. Schmitt, Nevada Bar Offers
Pro Bono Plan to Stem Nonlawyer Competition, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1995, at B3. Other
states considering the issue have rejected the creation of a pro bono requirement. See
generally A.B.A. CTR. FOR PRO BONO, THE LAW OF PRO BONO: MANDATORY,
ASSIGNED COUNSEL AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES (1994) (providing examples of the current
pro bono law in several states). From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, several national and
local bar associations considered and proposed mandatory pro bono. Ronald H.
Silverman, Conceiving a Lawyer's Legal Duty to the Poor, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 885, 889
(1991). State-level reform efforts were largely unsuccessful, particularly in Oregon,
Maryland, North Dakota, and Washington, where mandatory pro bono was resisted or
rejected. Id. at 894-95. Most recently, the Texas Supreme Court threw out a lawsuit
asking the state bar association to mandate pro bono, affirming the lower court's ruling
that the lower court had no jurisdiction in the case. Ben Wear, Court Decision Puts
Mandatory Pro Bono in Legal Limbo, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 23, 1994, at B6.
3. See Margo Piscevich, A View from the Top, NEV. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 2, 2
[hereinafter Piscevich, Feb. 1995] (stating that most members of the bar felt that the Board
of Governors had received insufficient input before the petition was filed).
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Within days SBN members voiced their opposition to the plan.
A" 'vocal minority'" 4 called the program" 'immoral'" and" 'socialis-
tic."" Some even accused the state bar of contributing to a "'wel-
fare state.' ,6 With such vehement opposition, the Board of Gover-
nors felt it had no choice but to withdraw the petition and instead
voted to develop new proposals for increasing voluntary pro bono.7
Mandatory pro bono supporters cannot shrug off what happened
in Nevada as the aberrant behavior of a bunch of "'cowboys."'" The
arguments Nevada attorneys raised have been part of the mandatory
pro bono debate all along.' While a twenty-hour annual requirement
averages out to only five minutes a day, five days a week, attorneys
inevitably balk when a state bar attempts to designate how that
time-however small-is spent. Those are their five minutes.
The purpose of this Comment is not to argue the merits of pro
bono service. With the recent cut in funding for the Legal Services
Corporation,"0 there is little doubt that the legal needs of low- and
moderate-income people are huge." The issue this Comment will
focus on is whether mandatory pro bono opponents correctly assert
that mandatory pro bono will paradoxically lead to a violation of
attorneys' ethical obligations.
This Comment will first use the recent history of pro bono in
Nevada as a case study to identify the obstacles to implementing
mandatory service programs. Next, it will briefly outline the most
common objections to mandatory pro bono. Finally, this Comment
4. Nevada's Pro Bono Mandate Triggers Anger Among Lawyers, LAWYER, May 2,
1995, at 5 [hereinafter Mandate Triggers Anger].
5. Franny Forsman,".. With Liberty and Justice for All?", NEV. LAW., June 1995,
at 12, 12.
6. 1&
7. Ed Vogel, Nevada Bar Abandons Pro Bono Requirement, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan.
14, 1995, at 3B.
8. Mandate Triggers Anger, supra note 4, at 5 (quoting a statement by Rosie Small,
Nevada State Bar director).
9. Forsman, supra note 5, at 12 (referring to some of the "routine arguments" raised
against mandatory pro bono).
10. On April 10, 1995, President Clinton signed a bill which cut $15 million from the
Legal Services Corporation's 1995 budget. L
11. Indigent people often have greater legal needs than those in the middle class.
Wear, supra note 2, at B6 (citing LeRoy Cordova, executive director of the Texas Equal
Access to Justice Foundation). However, some people still maintain that the poor and
middle class regard legal services as an expendable luxury. Jonathan R. Macey, Mandatory
Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for the Rich?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1116
(1992) (stating that mandatory pro bono will not help the poor since legal services are
"very, very low on a poor person's shopping list").
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will discuss these objections in light of the purpose and policy behind
the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, concluding that the ethical rules do not bar mandatory pro
bono.
II. THE STATE BAR OF NEVADA PETITION
In 1994 sixty percent of low- and moderate-income Nevada
households with legal problems had no legal services available to
them. 2 An estimated 26.4% of these households attempted to
handle legal problems on their own.1" Others neglected legal
problems entirely or received less assistance than they needed.
14
Even where voluntary pro bono programs were in place, such as in
Clark and Washoe counties, needs of residents far outpaced hours
volunteer attorneys could provide. 5
Into Nevada's legal vacuum slipped nonlawyer practitioners who
gladly serviced the working poor. 6 These practitioners, also called
scriveners, promised lower fees and equivalent services. 7 Indigent
clients were easy targets for scriveners since an estimated 25.8% of
households without legal representation believed either that lawyers
and legal remedies were too expensive or that a lawyer could not help
their situation.' But scriveners worked without attorney supervi-
sion, without having their work reviewed by an attorney, and without
regulation. 9 Unsurprisingly, clients using scriveners often received
substandard advice" while ultimately paying as much or more for
nonlawyer services as they would have spent to hire an attorney in the
first place.2'
12. THE STUDY COMM. ON AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVS. IN NEV., STATE BAR OF
NEV., THE NEVADA LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 3 (1994) [hereinafter NEVADA LEGAL NEEDS
STUDY].
13. Id.
14. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 2. Factors in some people's decision to forego
seeking legal services included fear of retaliation, fear of being turned down for legal aid,
and lack of knowledge of legal help sources. NEVADA LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note
12, at 4.
15. Forsman, supra note 5, at 12.
16. Id. Scriveners were charging consumers for help with filling out forms covering
simple bankruptcies, divorces, and wills. Schmitt, supra note 2, at B3.
17. Forsman, supra note 5, at 12; see Cramton, supra note 1, at 1117.
18. NEVADA LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 12, at 3. An estimated 23.1% of
households with no legal help sought third-party nonlegal advice. Id. at 23.
19. Piscevich, Nov. 1994, supra note 1, at 2.
20. Mike Yuille, Vegas to See Pro Bono Gamble, LAWYER, Dec. 20, 1994, at 5.
21. See Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 3; Forsman, supra note 5, at 12.
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Problems with scriveners became so intense that in 1992 the
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed an injunction against the unautho-
rized practice of law by a group of legal technicians.2 Because
nothing in the record evidenced the need for legal services to low-
income Nevadans, the court ordered that the SBN assemble a
committee to investigate the extent of the alleged unavailability of
legal services for low- and middle-income people" that seemed to be
fueling the growth of the scrivener industry.
The SBN assembled the Study Committee on Availability of
Legal Services in Nevada (Study Committee), comprised of practitio-
ners, judges, paralegals, educators, and others involved with providing
legal services to indigent people.24 The Study Committee undertook
telephone surveys and in-person interviews covering the northern
urban, southern urban, and rural sections of the state. During the
study period scriveners introduced legislation that would have created
a class of nonlawyers able to perform most legal functions-including
drafting pleadings, settling cases, and giving legal advice-with no
professional accountability.26 The SBN was able to convince the
state legislature to table the scriveners' legislation pending the results
of the Study Committee's findings.27
The Study Committee found that the number of Nevadans living
below the poverty line between 1980 and 1990 had grown to 240,000
citizens-an increase of seventy-four percent.' About 108,000 low-
and moderate-income Nevada households had experienced at least
one significant legal problem during the prior five years, primarily in
the areas of housing, employment, bankruptcy, and health care.29
The SBN used the Study Committee's findings to determine that
the best way to address the growing legal needs of the underserved
indigent population was to adopt a mandatory twenty-hour annual pro
22. Greenwell v. State Bar of Nev., 836 P.2d 70 (Nev. 1992).
23. Id. at 71.
24. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 1. The members of the Study Committee were
Franny Forsman, Gary Booker, Thomas Davis, Frances Doherty, Carolyn J. Embry, Doug
Emerick, Leonard Gang, Geoffrey Giles, Nancy Hart, Ishi Kunin, Jack Lehman, Sonny C.
Lyerly, Ernie Nielsen, Wayne Pressel, Kathleen Price, Rosie Small, and Julie Smith.
NEVADA LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 12, at 1.
25. NEVADA LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 12, at 49.
26. Piscevich, Nov. 1994, supra note 1, at 2.
27. 1l
28. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 2.
29. NEVADA LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 12, at 3.
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bono requirement for every SBN member practicing in Nevada."
The increase in pro bono service to the community would simulta-
neously mitigate the growing problems the scriveners caused by
removing some of the perceived obstacles to service.31 In addition,
the SBN drafted legislation to clarify Nevada's unauthorized practice
of law statute to help police scriveners. 2
On September 16, 1994, the SBN Board of Governors voted
unanimously to petition the Nevada Supreme Court to implement the
Study Committee's mandatory pro bono plan.33 The SBN an-
nounced the petition in the November issue of Nevada Lawyer,34 and
the petition was filed on November 10, 1994.1'
A. The Specifics of the Petition
To be truly mandatory, a compulsory pro bono program must
contain a quantifiable, enforceable, and enforced obligation that is a
condition of continuing licensure 6 The SBN plan contained all of
these elements. In addition, the petition had several options for
performing service.37
SBN members could receive prescreened clients through a bar-
sponsored referral service, obviating the need for attorneys to spend
their own time seeking out pro bono clients.38 Members could also
arbitrate or mediate in court-referred cases involving parties of low or
moderate means. 9 Alternatively, those wishing to forego ongoing
casework could fulfill their pro bono commitment by answering legal
questions at libraries, clinics, and courthouses; assisting specialty bar
associations in developing simple legal forms for in propia persona
30. Piscevich, Nov. 1994, supra note 1, at 4; Schmitt, supra note 2, at B3.
31. Schmitt, supra note 2, at B3.
32. Piscevich, Nov. 1994, supra note 1, at 4.
33. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 5. One member not present when the vote was
taken was quick to criticize the program and to point out that he was absent. Schmitt,
supra note 2, at B3 (quoting Coe Swobe).
34. Piscevich, Nov. 1994, supra note 1, at 4.
35. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 1.
36. Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the
Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 78, 81 (1990).
37. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 6-7. For details on other states' mandatory pro
bono proposals, see A.B.A. CrR. FOR PRO BONO, supra note 2.
38. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 6.
39. Id. at 6-7.
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litigants of low and moderate incomes; or providing service in any
other way approved by the SBN.4
Another pro bono option available to SBN members was to pay
$500 annually to an SBN fund.4' The SBN's Pro Bono Board, to be
established by the petition, would collect the fund of "buyout" money
and allocate grants to organizations whose sole purpose was to
provide legal service to low-income Nevada residents.42
Additionally, SBN members could accept referral cases from the
SBN's Lawyer Referral and Information Service on a reduced-fee
basis.43 Under this option, attorneys could charge up to $50 per
hour'-instead of the average fee of $150 per hour45 -and receive
two-thirds-hour credit toward their pro bono requirement for each
hour worked at the reduced fee.' The reduced fee option would
give the SBN a way to serve clients with modest incomes who would
ordinarily fall above the income restrictions for free legal aid.47
Members would report reduced fee hours, conventional pro bono
hours, and buyout payments to the SBN.' The SBN would be
responsible for enforcing the requirements against members who
40. Id. The SBN plan's service options were designed to fill the needs of low- and
moderate-income Nevadans and excluded clients such as nonprofit organizations and
others who have also traditionally benefited from free legal service. See id. at 6-8; supra
note 1. Other proposals that have restricted mandatory service to indigent people have
reduced the number of hours from the ABA's aspirational goal of 50 hours per year to
only 20 hours per year. See, e.g., Mary Coombs, Your Money or Your Life! A Modest
Proposal for Mandatory Pro Bono Services, 3 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 215,215 (1993) (stating
that the reduction in mandated hours was to offset the exclusion of nonindigent clients
from receiving service).
41. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 7.
42. I&
43. William Kerry Skaggs, State Bar Expands Lawyer Referral Service to Meet Needs
of Working Poor, NEV. LAW., Dec. 1994, at 4,4.
44. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 7.
45. Yuille, supra note 20, at 5.
46. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 7. Allowing attorneys to receive mandatory pro
bono credit for services rendered at a reduced fee comports with the public interest legal
service ethical obligation set forth in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules). MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 cmt. (1994) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES] (stating that participating in programs "in which the fee is substantially
below a lawyer's usual rate [is] encouraged").
47. Wm. Kerry Skaggs, The Reduced Fee Panel... Bridging the Gap of Unmet Legal
Needs, NEV. LAW., June 1995, at 18.
48. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 8.
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failed to meet their obligations.49 Members who did not comply with
the pro bono requirements could have their licenses revoked."0
B. SBN Members' Reaction
Although the press reported broad-based popular support,51
members complained that they were not consulted about the plan
before it was announced in Nevada Lawyer.s Mandatory pro bono
turned out to be a highly emotional issue that oddly united attorneys
and scriveners.s3 Nevada Supreme Court justice Charles Springer
denounced the SBN plan as "undemocratic." 4  SBN Board of
Governors member Coe Swobe, who was absent for the vote on the
petition, called it unfair to solo practitioners and criticized the
"'maternalistic attitude"' implicit in mandatory pro bono.a5 Nonlaw-
yer Glen Greenwell of Greenwell Paralegal Center in Reno claimed
the plan was "'self-serving.',56 Nevertheless, Greenwell dismissed
the notion that the SBN petition was a potential threat to his
business, saying that even mandatory pro bono could not realistically
meet all the legal needs of the low-income community.
57
Some of the most vigorous opponents of the program were
attorneys who donate many pro bono hours each year-often more
hours than the proposal required. 8 The underlying theme from
49. Il at 7.
50. See Piscevich, Nov. 1994, supra note 1, at 4. For a discussion of administrative and
enforcement management issues, see Silverman, supra note 2, at 906-08.
51. Yuille, supra note 20, at 5 (estimating that Nevada's judges, 75% of SBN leaders,
and the 1.5 million people living in the state supported the mandatory pro bono scheme).
52. In his opposition to the SBN petition, Nevada Supreme Court justice Charles E.
Springer asked the SBN Board of Governors to consult the membership about the plan.
Opposition to Petition for Amendment of Supreme Court Rule Relating to Mandatory
Contribution of Services or Money and Counter-Petition at 9, In re Amendment to the
Supreme Court Rules Mandating that Attorneys Licensed to Practice in the State of
Nevada Shall Perform Certain Hours of Pro Bono Publico (Nev. 1994) (ADKT 200)
[hereinafter Counter-Petition].
53. See Philip P. Houle, Is Mandatory Uncompensated Pro Bono in Civil Cases
Constitutional?, NEV. LAW., June 1995, at 20,20.
54. Counter-Petition, supra note 52, at 8.
55. Schmitt, supra note 2, at B3 (quoting SBN Board of Governors member Coe
Swobe).
56. l (quoting Glen Greenwell). Glen Greenwell was a defendant in the Nevada
case involving the unauthorized practice of law that provided the impetus to form the
Study Committee. See Greenwell v. State Bar of Nev., 836 P.2d 70 (Nev. 1992).
57. Schmitt, supra note 2, at B3 (citing Glen Greenwell).




these attorneys was an unwillingness to participate in the program
simply because it was "'mandatory." 5 9 Also among these oppo-
nents were those who felt that a mandatory pro bono requirement
cheapened the significance of their service.'
C. Abandoning the Petition
In January 1995, when the Board of Governors realized that
Nevada attorneys did not fully support the proposal, it decided to
withdraw the petition.61 Just as a New York State Bar Association
committee concluded that mandatory pro bono would be ineffective
because "effort expended voluntarily will normally produce far more
quality results than will conscripted effort,"6' the SBN determined
that it would be more beneficial to the working poor to extend
members the carrot of bar-supported voluntary pro bono programs
rather than the stick of mandatory service. 3 Its decision came only
days after The Wall Street Journal hailed the imminent adoption of
mandatory pro bono in Nevada.6 ,
Despite the SBN's withdrawal of the petition, the Nevada
Supreme Court asked that the Board of Governors continue with its
pro bono efforts.65 To satisfy the request of the court as well as the
needs of low-income Nevadans, the Board of Governors voted to
make providing legal services to the poor a "'number one priori-
ty." 66 A new SBN committee devised an alternate program to
address both the unmet legal needs of the working poor and the
problem of scriveners.67
The recommendations from the new committee included
aspirational goals for the number of pro bono hours Nevada attorneys
should render annually, a call for further examination of legal needs
in the state, the creation of local committees to determine how best
to meet regional legal needs, increased funding for the SBN's lawyer
referral service, and an offer of free programming in exchange for pro
59. Id. (quoting Rosie Small, Nevada State Bar director).
60. See infra part II.B.I.
61. Vogel, supra note 7, at 3B.
62. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. TO REVIEW THE
PROPOSED PLAN FOR MANDATORY PRO BONO SERVICE 37 (1989).
63. See Forsman, supra note 5, at 13.
64. Schmitt, supra note 2, at B3.
65. Piscevich, Feb. 1995, supra note 3, at 2.
66. 1&
67. Forsman, supra note 5, at 13.
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bono service-including free continuing legal education in areas of
poverty law.' The revised plan also included a two-year examina-
tion period to determine the plan's success.
69
The new committee's intent was to increase volunteerism in those
areas that the Study Committee found the most critically underserved:
family law, consumer protection, landlord-tenant, and employment."
If what members said was true-that they would provide pro bono
service so long as they were not forced to provide it-creating
opportunities for pro bono would increase significantly the satisfaction
of legal needs in the community.
III. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST MANDATORY PRO BONO
The arguments raised by the vocal minority opposing mandatory
pro bono in Nevada are not new.71 The ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards' (the Kutak Commission)"
original draft of the Model Rules that called for mandatory pro
bono7 met with opposition for political and philosophical rea-
sons-including a feeling that mandatory service implied an unwar-
ranted lack of confidence in attorneys' commitment to the communi-
ty.74 Opposition was so strong that the adoption of the Model Rules
68. Id at 13-14.
69. Id. at 14.
70. Piscevich, Feb. 1995, supra note 3, at 2.
71. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 & legal
background (1992).
72. Smith, supra note 1, at 727-28.
73. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 8.1 (Discussion Draft 1980).
The proposed language read:
A lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service. A lawyer may
discharge this responsibility by service in activities for improving the law, the
legal system, or the legal profession, or by providing professional services to
persons of limited means or to public service groups or organizations. A lawyer
shall make an annual report concerning such service to appropriate regulatory
authority.
Iat (emphasis added).
74. Smith, supra note 1, at 728. In contrast to the SBN petition, the vague language
of the Kutak Commission's proposal did not include a specified number of hours, a system
of reporting, or a way of punishing those who did not comply. IU Neither did it include
any provisions for attorneys serving in military, government, judicial, or public interest
organizations. Id. In short, it was neither quantifiable nor practically enforceable. See
supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
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as a whole was jeopardized. In the end opposition rendered the
language of Model Rule 6.1 nonenforceable. 76
Regulatory bodies before and including the SBN have been
reluctant to combat the political difficulties of member participation
in mandatory pro bono programs and have repeatedly allowed the
arguments that follow to come between legal services and the poor.77
This Comment will first present general arguments to mandatory pro
bono, then arguments specifically relating to attorneys' ethical
obligations.
A. General Arguments
1. Argument one: "mandatory pro bono is unconstitutional"
Opponents of mandatory pro bono raise a constitutional shield
against required service, invoking the guarantees of freedom of
association and belief; freedom from uncompensated takings; and
freedom from involuntary servitude.7
75. Smith, supra note i, at 728.
76. MODEL RULES, supra note 46, Rule 6.1. Nevada Supreme Court Rule 191 strongly
encourages members to perform pro bono work, although the SBN has found that many
objectors appeared unaware of this rule. NEV. SUP. CT. R. 191 (Michie 1995) ("A lawyer
should render public interest legal service."); Forsman, supra note 5, at 14 n.3. Although
Rule 191 does not specify the number of hours members should serve each year, Model
Rule 6.1 set 50 hours per year as the aspirational goal for every lawyer-150% more hours
than the SBN petition required. MODEL RULES, supra note 46, Rule 6.1.
77. See Lardent, supra note 36. at 99-100; cf. Sol Wachtler, Introduction, 19 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 739,743 (1991) (announcing that New York would defer adopting mandatory pro
bono).
78. See Forsman, supra note 5, at 12-13. Opponents have also raised the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions in conjunction with the constitutional arguments outlined in
Part III.A as a way of rebutting mandated service. E.g., State ex reL Scott v. Roper, 688
S.W.2d 757,769 (Mo. 1985) (en bane). The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions applied
in the context of mandatory pro bono says that the "right to practice law, or to engage in
any occupation requiring a state license, must not be predicated upon the relinquishment
of constitutional rights." Cunningham v. Superior Ct., 177 Cal. App. 3d 336,347,222 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 861 (1986) (citations omitted). The unconstitutional conditions argument
depends on finding a constitutional right. See id Even assuming that mandatory pro bono
does implicate a constitutional right, however, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
is inapplicable when there is a compelling state interest for instituting the requirement.
See Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251, 252 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), cerL
denied, 498 U.S. 814 (1990). Since such a large percentage of legal needs was unmet it is
likely that Nevada's interest in ensuring universal access to justice would be compelling
enough to outweigh the alleged relinquishment of constitutional rights.
January 1996]
920 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
a. First Amendment
Opponents argue that mandatory pro bono which designates the
agencies that could receive service under pro bono requirements,
violates the First Amendment right to be free from coerced associa-
tion with ideas, causes, and conduct held by others.79 Others argue
that mandatory pro bono creates ,and supports a value system that
implicates these First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and
association. 0 However, a First Amendment analysis would not have
applied to the SBN's petition. The petition's service options would
have been so flexible that SBN members would not be forced to
espouse any particular belief, thus no rights of association or belief
would have been implicated."'
The First Amendment argument would have been similarly weak
against the SBN's buyout option. There would be no First Amend-
ment right to determine what organizations would be funded with
money from the buyout.' As a mandatory bar the SBN's rules are
codified as statutes.83 Just as taxpayers have no constitutional right
to have their payments directed toward specific causes or prevent
funding of specific causes,' attorneys would have had no First
Amendment recourse to dispute what organization received money
paid to the SBN buyout fund.8
b. Fifth Amendment
Opponents rely on two components of a Fifth Amendment
"takings" argument to rebut mandatory pro bono. First, opponents
assert that attorneys' services are property within the meaning of the
79. See Houle, supra note 53, at 24-25.
80. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1990).
81. This statement assumes that providing service to a particular group of poor people
is not the same as espousing a political belief. See Coombs, supra note 40, at 223 n.20.
82. But see Keller, 496 U.S. at 14 (holding that there are limits to the types of activities
that a bar association can support using funds raised through member dues). The
difference between the financial obligation disputed in Keller-bar association membership
dues-and the financial obligation in the SBN plan-the buyout election-is that the SBN
buyout was not the sole way of fulfilling the mandatory pro bono condition of member-
ship. SBN members had several other nonfinancial service options to support the activity
of their choice wherein no First Amendment right would be implicated.
83. E.g., NEV. SUP. Cr. R. 191 (Michie 1995) (Nevada's voluntary pro bono rule).
84. For a discussion of general tax considerations with regard to mandatory pro bon,
see Silverman, supra note 2, at 941-48.
85. Coombs, supra note 40, at 223-24.
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Fifth Amendment.86 Opponents assert attorney services are indeed
property because requiring attorneys to provide free use of their stock
and trade is akin to taking "a grocer's stock, an electrician's tools, or
an individual's home.
87
Once opponents conclude that attorney services are property,
they claim that mandatory pro bono would still withstand any further
Fifth Amendment challenge because government-mandated takings
may not be used for ideological purposes unrelated to the business of
the bar, including, presumably, pro bono service to the poor.88 As
with the other constitutional objections, however, courts have not
been able to reach a consensus on the Fifth Amendment issue. 9
c. Thirteenth Amendment
Opponents, like the SBN's vocal minority, claim that the
mandatory pro bono requirement is a form of involuntary servitude
in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment." Numerous courts have
rejected this Thirteenth Amendment argument9' primarily because
mandatory pro bono does not impair attorneys' physical liberty.2
Possible disbarment or revocation of license for refusing to perform
pro bono services has not been enough to induce courts to invalidate
mandatory service. 3 The SBN petition's flexibility would have given
86. See Colbert v. Rickmon, 747 F. Supp. 518, 520 (W.D. Ark. 1990). Some courts
have held that attorneys' services can be interpreted as property. See, e.g., Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (holding that a state could not
exclude an applicant to the bar without reason); Bedford y. Salt Lake County, 447 P.2d
193, 195 (Utah 1968) (holding that compulsory attorney service without compensation is
a taking).
87. Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 764. For a discussion of comparisons of attorneys to other
professionals, see infra part III.B.3.
88. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 14 (holding that bar dues may not be used for ideological
purposes); cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (holding that
union dues may only be used for ideological purposes where employees do not object to
advancing those ideas and are not coerced into financing those ideological purposes).
89. Compare United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965) ("[Tlhe lawyer
has consented to, and assumed, this [pro bono] obligation and when he is called upon to
fulfill it, he cannot contend that it is a 'taking of his services.' "), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978
(1966) with Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 769 ("We will not permit the State to deprive a citizen
of this constitutional right [to the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry] as a
condition to granting a license or privilege.").
90. Vogel, supra note 7, at 3B.
91. See In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 573 So. 2d 800,805 (Fla.
1990). Contra Bedford, 447 P.2d at 195.
92. Houle, supra note 53, at 25.
93. Id. But see John C. Scully, Mandatory Pro Bono: An Attack on the Constitution,
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attorneys the opportunity to fulfill their requirements in virtually any
location and for virtually any organization94 thus eliminating the
constraints opponents predicted.
2. Argument two: "the community doesn't need legal services"
Some opponents argue that mandatory pro bono is unnecessary
because there are no unmet legal needs in the community."
Nevada's statistics, however, had demonstrated the contrary.
Moreover, as the number of Nevadans with unmet legal needs
increased,96 the number of public interest attorneys available had
decreased.97 In Nevada attorneys had tried to satisfy those needs
through voluntary pro bono programs. 8 However, the pro bono
programs could only help a narrow group of low-income clients
because of lack of government funding and low attorney participa-
tion.99 Nevada attorneys had also tried to increase legal access for
underserved populations by encouraging alternative methods of
dispute resolution, such as mediation or arbitration." Again, due
to a shortage of government funding and attorney volunteers, even
alternative methods failed to broaden significantly the base of legal
help for the needy. 1
Even if Nevada had been without unmet legal needs, opponents
cannot assert this argument against mandatory pro bono nationwide.
In 1981 the national ratio of legal services attorneys to eligible
indigents was 1 to 9585."02 By 1989 the New York State Bar
19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1229, 1261 (1991) (arguing that law school indebtedness may
constrain attorneys' choice between compliance or revocation of license).
94. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 6-7.
95. Coombs, supra note 40, at 216.
96. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
97. E.g., Vogel, supra note 7, at 3B (citing Nevada Legal Services executive director
Wayne Pressel as saying that Nevada Legal Services' 18-attorney staff has been cut nearly
in half as a result of reduction of federal grants).
98. See, e.g., Nancy E. Hart, Volunteer Lawyers of Washoe County, NEV. LAW., June
1995, at 15 (describing the pro bono efforts of local lawyers working with poor clients for
the past five years); Dennis M. Hetherington, Clark County Pro Bono Project, NEV. LAW.,
June 1995, at 17 (describing Clark County's volunteer program working with low- and
moderate-income clients for the past 10 years); Rural County Pro Bono Program, NEV.
LAW., June 1995, at 16 (describing new efforts for poor clients coordinated by Nevada
Legal Services).
99. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 4.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Howard A. Matalon, Note, The Civil Indigent's Last Chance for MeaningfulAccess
to the Federal Courts: The Inherent Power to Mandate Pro Bono Publico, 71 B.U. L. REV.
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Association Legal Needs Study reported that New York low-income
households were facing an average of more than two noncriminal
legal problems without legal assistance during the study year. 3 In
1991 the Texas State Bar determined that available sources met only
sixteen percent of the legal needs of Texas's 3.5 million poor peo-
ple.1" In 1993 the ABA reported that legal resources were address-
ing only about fifteen to twenty percent of legal needs among the
indigent population. 5
Yet attorney participation in voluntary pro bono programs has
not increased significantly despite greatly intensified and highly
creative recruiting efforts. 6 In 1990 only an average of 16.9% of
attorneys participated in organized pro bono programs for the
poor." 7 Today at most only twenty to thirty percent of attorneys
participate in any type of pro bono.1°8 Clearly the need for legal
services does exist, and it is staggering."
545, 547 n.12 (1991).
103. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, THE NEW YORK LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 159 (1993).
For a general discussion of the way New York was striving to meet legal needs, see
Silverman, supra note 2, at 928-41.
104. Wear, supra note 2, at B6.
105. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PUB. SERv. RESPONSI-
BILITY ET AL., REPORT ACCOMPANYING PROPOSED REVISIONS TO MODEL RULE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 6.1, at 6-7 (1993).
106. Lardent, supra note 36, at 90.
107. ld. This figure had been reported by the ABA as 17.7% in 1988. Richard Lacayo,
The Sad Fate of Legal Aid, TIME, June 20,1988, at 59,59 [hereinafter Lacayo, LegalAid].
108. Houle, supra note 53, at 20.
109. Some mandatory pro bono opponents concede the apparent deficiency in the
number of pro bono attorneys for indigent clients but argue that the indigent population
does not actually desire legal help. Scully, supra note 93, at 1235. These opponents argue
that "there is no necessary connection between an increase in poverty and the need for
increased legal services." At at 1234. These opponents presume that the legal system has
no practical application in the everyday lives of the indigent population. I at 1235 ("If
given the option, the poor might very well prefer a cash payment in lieu of legal services.
It is not at all certain that the poor place as a high a value on legal service as does [New
York's Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services]."). Accordingly, despite
the relatively small ranks of public interest attorneys as compared to the number of legal
problems to solve, opponents conclude that the indigent population will not in any case
utilize legal services. See generally Macey, supra note 11, at 1117 (asserting that "poor
people do not hire lawyers because they use their limited resources to buy things that they
value more than legal services").
But can state bar associations dismiss mandatory pro bono based on opponents'
presumption that low-income people have better ways to spend their money? See
Wachtler, supra note 77, at 742 ("1 have yet to hear of a lawyer who, despite a conscien-
tious effort, has been unable to find someone in need of pro bono legal services. And no
one in the legal services community has come forward to say 'Thanks, but no thanks-we
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3. Argument three: "mandating service for the indigent
population is not the duty of the state bar"
Some mandatory pro bono opponents claim that shortage of legal
services is a matter for the legislative and judicial branches of
government who have failed to ensure universally affordable
justice."' Others believe that it is the legislature alone, not the
courts, who should be: responsible for providing legal services."' In
the concurring opinion of a recent Texas Supreme Court case that
threw out a lawsuit asking the State Bar of Texas to mandate pro
bono, one justice wrote, "This Court lacks the resources and/or the
political will to attempt further resolution of the profound problem of
providing legal services for indigent citizens.... The Legislature is
better suited to tackle this social problem."
' 2
Opponents of mandatory pro bono also argue that the regulatory
bodies of doctors and other licensed professionals impose no public
service obligation, therefore bar associations should not be able to
mandate pro bono."3  These opponents believe that requiring
attorneys to undertake litigation that society would not otherwise
support will confirm suspicions that attorneys take themselves "way,
way too seriously."- 4  .
However, comparisons to other professions are inappropriate."5
Hospital doctors are barred by federal and some state statutes from
denying an indigent patient urgent care treatment;1 6 however, no
don't need the help.' "). From a practical standpoint, it is in attorneys' own interests to
fill society's legal needs-real or perceived-or risk having their professional freedom
curtailed. Smith, supra note 1, at 734" ("If the legal profession does not address society's
needs, society will satisfy those needs through other means, thus reducing the autonomy
that the profession currently enjoys.").
110. See Matalon, supra note 102, at 546.
111. Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 769 ("The courts of this state have no inherent power to
appoint or compel attorneys to serve in civil actions without compensation. Providing for
such representation and the funding thereof is a matter for legislative action.").
112. State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 248 (Tex. 1994) (Gonzalez, J.,
concurring).
113. Colbert, 747 F. Supp. at 525; Forsman, supra note 5, at 12; Silverman, supra note
2, at 1011-12.
114. Macey, supra note 11, at 1123.
115. However, if lawyers' duty to the poor were compared to the duty of, for example,
doctors, it is arguable that the medical profession has many more burdens than lawyers
would have, even under an annual 20-hour requirement. Silverman, supra note 2, at 1012-
13.
116. AL at 1013.
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parallel laws or comparable "emergency room" services exist for
indigent litigants."7 In addition, other professions have no "ancient
and established tradition" of pro bono as does the legal profes-
sion."'
Moreover, unmet legal needs are a burden best shouldered by the
regulatory bodies of the legal profession rather than by society as a
whole,1 9 in part because attorneys have helped to cause some of the
problems of the indigent population."' The legal profession has
traditionally discouraged cost-reducing innovations such as mediation,
arbitration, and other alternative dispute resolution strategies,
relegating indigent citizens to a cycle of ever-growing legal prob-
lems."' Nevada's battle against scriveners-notwithstanding the
abuse of the legal process by some nonlawyer practitioners-is an
example of such resistance." While other professional licensing
bodies may not require pro bono service for their members, the




1. Argument one: "attorney expertise won't satisfy client need"
Opponents assert that mandatory pro bono is impractical because
attorneys may be forced to accept cases in areas where they have no
expertise just to fulfill their required hours.24  Other opponents
claim that because the interests and skills of the available attorneys
117. Telephone Interview with Franny Forsman, President-Elect, State Bar of Nevada
(July 18, 1995).
118. Dillon, 346 F.2d at 635.
119. Barlow F. Christensen, The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM.
B. FOUND. RnS. J. 1, 16-17.
120. Silverman, supra note 2. at 1016-18 (describing ways indigent people are harmed,
directly and indirectly, by attorneys). ,
121. Id. at 1018. The SBN petition did provide for several ways to serve indigent
Nevadans, including alternative dispute resolution and other methods to minimize the
number of instances where indigent people would need to go to court. See Nevada
Petition, supra note 1, at 6-7.
122. Piscevich, Nov. 1994, supra note 1, at 4.
123. See Silverman, supra note 2, at 1015 ("[Elven assuming that the lawyers are truly
singled out by mandatory pro bono programs, they deserve to be.").
124. See Forsman, supra note 5, at 12 (citing claims that mandatory pro bono would
cause malpractice).
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would be unlikely to match the needs of indigent clients, they should
not be mandated to perform service at all."2
In Nevada the SBN plan's flexibility would have mooted the
argument that available skills would not match client need. Although
it could be challenging to find ways for corporate counsel, government
employees, or criminal lawyers to assist in areas of greatest need, the
SBN plan encompassed a broad spectrum of pro bono activities.
26
Moreover, the buyout would have funded gaps where legal needs and
available skills didn't match. 27
In part to alleviate concerns about effectiveness of service, the
SBN had also planned to implement a mentoring component as part
of its mandatory pro bono plan."z Mentoring would have drawn in
some of the SBN's emeritus and inactive members and given the large
population of young solo practitioners a chance to benefit from the
experience and wisdom of these older members through working
alongside attorneys with expertise in the field.29 In general,
mentoring provides a way for older members to stay involved in the
legal community without having to maintain full-time practices.
Opponents' underlying argument is that mandatory pro bono will
force attorneys to violate their ethical duty to represent clients
competently because their knowledge of the areas where indigent
people would need help most would be insufficient to comply with the
ethical rules. 3' This argument will be discussed further in Part IV
however, the possibility that some people might remain underserved
125. Coombs, supra note 40, at 224; e.g.. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S.
296, 300 (1989) (outlining an attorney's claim that a statute compelling him "to represent
indigent inmates in a complex action requiring depositions and discovery, cross-
examination of witnesses, and other trial skills... would compel him to violate his ethical
obligation to take on only those cases he could handle competently"). This argument
attacks public service in general rather than mandatory service specifically. Wachtler,
supra note 77, at 741.
126. STATE BAR OF NEV., WHAT IS PRO BONO? (1995) [hereinafter WHAT IS PRO
BONO?].
127. Coombs, supra note 40, at 224 (stating that financial contributions can be used to
fund forms of legal service most desired by potential pro bono clients).
128. Telephone Interview with Franny Forsman, supra note 117.
129. Contra Richard Lacayo, You Don't Always Get Perry Mason, TIME, June 1, 1992,
at 38, 39 (quoting Reno public defender Shelly O'Neill as saying that no amount of
mentoring could be effective for certain types of cases, comparing it to "'calling a dentist
to do a brain surgeon's work' ").
130. Id; Coombs, supra note 40, at 217, 224.
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even with mandatory pro bono is ultimately irrelevant to whether
required service is effective.
131
2. Argument two: "mandatory pro bono produces lower quality
service than voluntary pro bono"
The Nevada proposal was broad enough to allow attorneys to
have retained wide latitude in choosing their pro bono clients;
132
however, even the most flexible mandatory pro bono program still
requires attorneys to serve whether or not it is convenient. 33
However, opponents who assert that mandatory pro bono would
produce lower quality service ultimately contend that mandated
service would affect their attitude toward the service-and to the
client." 4
The word "mandatory" is defined as "authoritatively ordered;
obligatory,"'35 and some opponents take offense at the implications
of being authoritatively ordered to do anything.16  The rationale
seems to be that the reluctance to provide pro bono service will
impact the ability to provide service concomitant with the commit-
ment attorneys vowed to undertake. Attorneys raising this argument
seem to equate serving with a bad attitude with poor service. This
Comment will discuss in Part IV whether in light of the ethical rules
it is valid to reject mandatory service because service may be
rendered resentfully.
Opponents also contend that mandatory pro bono would cheapen
pro bono service as a whole, eliminating psychic value to attor-
neys.37 They claim that pro bono is a charitable act with a peculiar
131. Coombs, supra note 40, at 224; see also Silverman, supra note 2, at 1024 n.281
("The critical metaphor of choice holds that mandatory pro bono programs are unlikely
to make much of 'a dent' in an extremely serious problem, described in terms of a very
large unmet need for civil legal services.").
132. See Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 6-7.
133. While the El Paso Bar Association (EPBA) allows members to be excused from
its annual mandatory pro bono requirements for "hardship," the standard for a successful
claim of hardship is quite stringent and would almost certainly exclude mere inconve-
nience. Telephone Interview with Nancy Gallego, El Paso Bar Association (Sept. 29,
1995).
134. Lacayo, Legal Aid, supra note 107, at 59 (stating that mandatory pro bono could
lead to "inadequate representation by advocates who lack the conviction or specific legal
skills to defend the poor").
135. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICrIONARY 824 (1991).
136. Mandate Triggers Anger, supra note 4, at 5.
137. See Coombs, supra note 40, at 217.
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benefit to attorneys rendering the service;'38 to ensure receipt of this
benefit, charity should never be mandated.'39 As one court stated:
"Compelled legal service is totally inconsistent with the giving of pro
bono service as a matter of professional responsibility or professional
pride. The latter two involve a matter of professional choice. It is
the choice that makes the rendering of the service self-fulfilling,
pleasant, interesting, and successful." 1" The argument is that free
legal service would become qualitatively different to attorneys if no
longer voluntary-and threatens to become something less significant
to the client as well.
141
But the foundation of pro bono is obligation,4  thus the
primary purpose of mandatory pro bono is "to increase legal services
for the poor. ... not to make lawyers better people."'43 Pro bono
is professional tithing-a requirement inherent in being part of the
legal community'" because law is a monopoly and only those with the
exclusive license to practice law are authorized to perform servic-
es." Even if there were an essential difference in the service
rendered, such difference would be immaterial to those who benefit
from pro bono. There is no qualitative difference between the way
mandated service and voluntary service are received. Performing pro
bono service can be personally rewarding, but statistics in Nevada and
across the nation show that reliance on attorneys to make this "self-
138. d at 216.
139. Forsman, supra note 5, at 12.
140. State ex reL Scott v. Roperi 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
141. E.g., Scully, supra note 93, at 1264.
142. See generally Sandra Day O'Connor, Legal Education and Social Responsibility,
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 661 (1985) (stating that lawyers have moral and social
responsibilities that need to be "discharged by the Bar, willingly, and some would say, even
unwillingly").
143. Coombs, supra note 40, at 216, 220-21 n.14.
144. Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV.
311, 362 (1990). Opponents characterize mandatory pro bono as less of a "tithe" than a
"regulatory tax," claiming that it is a "compulsory levy or exaction, regularly imposed by
government without conditioning taxpayer liability on any specific benefit received."
Silverman, supra note 2, at 942. For a more detailed discussion of mandatory pro bono
as a regulatory tax in the context of the report of New York's Committee to Improve the
Availability of Legal Services, see id, at 942-48.
145. Wachtler, supra note 77, at 740. The "monopoly" argument in favor of mandatory
pro bono is particularly applicable in Nevada, where members wanted to strengthen
statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. See Piscevich, Nov. 1994, supra note
1, at 1; infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
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fulfilling" professional choice is not meeting the needs of the poor."
3. Argument three: "buying out of the pro bono
requirement is unethical"
The SBN's $500 buyout would have given members an additional
service option that would also increase legal services funding.'47
The vocal minority in Nevada, however, disliked the buyout op-
tion,'48 claiming that it was unfair to solo practitioners and small
firms because mandatory pro bono requirements could significantly
impact their working hours or available income.'49
Other mandatory pro bono opponents argue that the relatively
modest amount of the buyout would -make it more likely that
attorneys in large firms would never render hands-on service."5 At
$500 the buyout would represent only two or three billable hours at
large firms' typical hourly rates of $150 to $200, making it likely that
large firms would find it more cost-effective, to use the buyout.' s'
Opponents claim the buyout is thus another example of how
mandatory pro bono programs are the most lenient on those who can
best afford to be charitable-large firms.52
But the buyout is not significantly disproportionate. The $500
buyout only represents four to seven billable hours at a typical small
firm or solo practitioner rate of $75 to $150 per hour.' In addi-
tion, the buyout actually helps resolve equity problems by providing
146. See supra part III.A.3. Mandatory pro bono is not likely to receive the same
degree of peer recognition as voluntary pro bono. E.g., Joseph Wharton, Applause, Please,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 101 (recognizing attorneys for public service).
147. Nevada Petition, supra note 1, at 7.
148. Vogel, supra note 7, at 3B.
149. See also Cramton, supra note 1, at 1128-29 (explaining that mandatory pro bono
will be more "onerous" to solo practitioners and attorneys in small firms). -
150. Ironically, the buyout was conceived by New York's Committee to Improve the
Availability of Legal Services as a means of helping solo practitioners meet the mandatory
pro bono requirement. Silverman, supra note 2. at 905.
151. See also Cramton, supra note 1, at 1133 (describing how senior attorneys could
shift the burden of pro bono work to newer attorneys).
152. See also Coombs, supra note 40, at 217 (presenting the argument that mandatory
pro bono obligations are inequitable). For further discussion- of equity issues, see
Silverman, supra note 2, at 1006-11.
153. Other proposals that included a buyout option have attempted to link the buyout
amount to the amount the attorney charges per hour. For' example, an attorney who
charges a basic per hour rate of $100 would pay $2000 to buy out of the 20-hour pro bono
requirement. Coombs, supra note 40, at 233. Other mandatory pro bono proposals have
required as little as $50 per hour. Silverman, supra note 2, at 916.
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ways to include attorneys often exempted from other mandatory
service proposals, typically government attorneys and judges."5
Opponents also claim that the buyout is inherently unethical.55
A Florida supreme court justice called Florida's buyout provision "an
easy incentive to avoid the more significant, necessary, and direct help
that is essential if the impact is to be real."'5 6 In the same decision
another justice took an even stronger stance:
I find it ethically repugnant to suggest that an obligation
inhering in each attorney personally can be discharged
merely by a contribution of money. Under this provision,
financially able attorneys can buy their way clear of the
aspirational duty to help the poor, while less financially able
attorneys who take their ethical obligations seriously will be
constrained to donate services. Both [types of attorneys]
should be treated equally. 7
Although these judges mention no specific ethical rule that the
buyout violates, it is difficult to dispute that these "mere" financial
contributions can be the most significant, necessary, and direct ways
to provide experienced legal services to the poor.5 ' Buyout funds
can support full-time attorneys who specialize in legal problems of the
poor, especially those working on cases with the potential to last for
years.'59 In 1986 about half of Florida's Orange County Bar Associ-
ation members chose to buy out of their mandatory pro bono
requirements, bringing in about $100,000 for the nongovernment-
funded Legal Aid Society of the Orange County Bar Association.
160
If 3000 Nevada attorneys chose the buyout option, they could raise
$1.5 million annually for new and existing pro bono services. 6' The
154. Coombs, supra note 40, at 224-25. For a discussion of the issues related to
government attorneys and mandatory pro bono, see Committee on Ethics, Report of the
Committee on Ethics, 15 ENERGY L. 193, 197-99 (1994); Lisa G. Lerman, Public Service
by Public Servants, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1141, 1150-57 (1991).
155. Counter-Petition, supra note 52, at 4 n.3 (expressing "concerns about the propriety
of involuntary assessments").
156. Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 630 So. 2d 501, 506 (Fla. 1993)
(Barkett, C.J., concurring).
157. hId at 507 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. See Cramton, supra note 1, at 1128.
159. Cynthia R. Watkins, Note, In Support of a Mandatory Pro Bono Rule for New
York State, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 177, 182 (1991); see Coombs, supra note 40, at 220,
160. Jim Miskiewicz, Mandatory Pro Bono Won't Disappear, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 23, 1987,
at 1, 8.
161. Yuille, supra note 20, at 5 (citing Wayne Pressel, chief executive of Nevada Legal
Services, a nonprofit pro bono law firm).
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argument that the buyout is unethical will be discussed in more detail
with regard to the ethical rules in Part IV.
IV. MANDATORY PRO BONO AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
The vocal minority in Nevada and opponents through the years
have successfully argued not only that mandatory pro bono will not
work, 62 but also that it cannot work if attorneys are to be ethical.
The specter of ethical violations has, in part, kept licensing bodies
from implementing mandatory public service and the judiciary from
sanctioning it.
Opponents argue, as outlined above in Part III, that mandatory
representation would trap attorneys into violating their ethical
obligations by creating situations where attorneys would represent
clients without zeal or competence. In addition, they argue that the
possibility of buying out of the pro bono requirement is unethical
because attorneys could avoid hands-on service. Each of these
arguments is addressed below to clarify how mandatory representation
comports with ethical obligations.
A. Ethical Evaluation
To my clients I will be faithful; and in their causes, zealous
and industrious. ... I shall never close my ear or heart,
because my client's means are low. Those who have none,
and who have just causes, are, of all others, the best entitled
to sue, or be defended; and they shall receive a due portion
of my services, cheerfully given."
Attorneys' basic ethical obligations in representing clients
originated in David Hoffman's A Course of Legal Study. This section
of Hoffman's oath outlines the first two areas in which opponents
claim they will be forced to commit ethical violations under mandato-
ry pro bono. The third area, the buyout, will be discussed as well.
1. Zeal and diligence
Modem attorneys find Hoffman's pledge in the comment to
Model Rule 1.3 that states that a lawyer should act "with zeal in
162. Forsman, supra note 5, at 13.
163. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 758 (Philadelphia, Thomas,
Cowperthwait & Co., 2d ed. 1846).
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advocacy upon the client's behalf."'" Opponents claim that man-
datory pro bono would lead to violations of the zealous representation
obligation because attorneys would inevitably render service resentful-
ly." Opponents would be reluctant to serve clients because that
obligation had been forced on them and because they no longer
received the psychic value of voluntarily doing a good, deed."6
Opponents also claim that they will naturally be inclined to spend
more time on paying clients' cases than on pro bono cases and that
this will also lead to ethical violations.
However, performing mandatory service with a bad attitude
would not in itself violate attorneys' ethical obligation of zealous
representation. The germane measure of ethical compliance is the
objective manifestation of the zealous representation, not the
subjective mental state of those rendering it. Moreover, spending less
time on pro bono cases does not automatically violate the zealous
representation obligation. 67 Attorneys are not required to "press
for every advantage that might be realized" for any client. 16 For
needy clients, merely competent-rather than fervent-representation
under mandatory pro bono would still give access to legal services not
otherwise available.
Opponents also raise Model Rule 1.3, the rule obligating
attorneys to serve clients diligently, as an area where they believe
mandatory pro bono will cause ethical violations. Hoffman's oath to
"never close my ear or heart, because my client's means are low;"
state statutes that prohibit attorneys from turning away the indi-
gent; 1 69 and the comment to Model Rule 1.3 make it clear that
clients should be represented "despite opposition, obstruction or
personal inconvenience" to the attorney."' Attorneys who fail to
164. MODEL RULES, supra note 46, Rule .1.3 cmt. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, the ethical rules that preceded the Model Rules, also codified the zealous
representation requirement. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1
(1981).
165. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
167. The ethical rules only obligate a lawyer to act with "reasonable diligence" in
representing a client. MODEL RULES, supra note 46, Rule 1.3.
168. Id Rule 1.3 cmt.
169. See, eg., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(h) (West 1990) (codifying the duty of
California lawyers "fn]ever to reject, for any consideration personal to himself or herself,
the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed").
170. MODEL RULES, supra note 46, Rule 1.3 cmt.
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participate in a mandatory plan or who represent clients half-
heartedly do ultimately violate their ethical requirement of diligence.
2. Competence
When mandatory pro bono opponents argue that attorneys'
expertise -wouldn't match clients' needs, they essentially invoke the
competence requirement, Model Rule 1.1.171 Opponents claim that
mandatory service would force representation to fall below the
threshold of competence because attorneys could be placed on cases
where they were unsophisticated in the nuances of the law.172
Model Rule 6.2 also implicates the competence rule, stating that "[a]
lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment bya tribunal to represent
a person except for good cause"'" where good cause for avoiding
an appointment includes not being competent to handle the case.174
The comment to Model Rule 1.1, however,. indicates that
attorneys can still provide adequate representation through necessary
study even without prior expertise in the area of the law in which the
client requires assistance. 75 In general, attorneys' fundamental
lawyering skills necessarily transcend particular specialized legal
knowledge, so it would not cause ethical violations to undertake pro
bono cases in areas where attorneys have little prior experience.
76
The comment to Model Rule 1.1 also encourages attorneys to consult
specialists in unfamiliar areas of the law, indicating that, for example,
attorneys specializing in bankruptcy would not automatically be
disqualified from handling simple divorces."7
3. Financial contribution versus hands-on service
Contrary to what opponents assert outlined in Part III.B.3, a
buyout is not unethical. Nowhere do the ethical rules make a
distinction that financial contributions to organizations that provide
legal services to the indigent population are improper as compared to
hands-on service to the indigent population. Indeed, Model Rule 6.1
and its comment affirmatively suggest that giving money to organiza-
171. Id. Rule 1.1.
172. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
173. Id. Rule 6.2.
174. I& Rule 6.2 cmt.
175. 1& Rule 1.1 cmt.
176. See Brown, supra note 1, at 460.
177. MODEL RULES, supra note 46, Rule 1.1 cmt.
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tions that fund legal services for the poor can complete attorneys'
ethical obligation to the underserved population. 7 ' The comment
states that to the extent that attorneys do not fulfill pro bono service
hours through hands-on service, they can complete the remaining
commitment by paying money to legal services organizations.179 The
comment also states that it is proper to give to legal services
organizations when it is not feasible for attorneys to engage in pro
bono services."'
Buyout funds are invariably used to give money to legal services
organizations as stated in Model Rule 6.1, thus a buyout would not
violate the letter or the spirit of the rule. In addition, although the
comment does seem to validate social awareness through hands-on
service as a goal of pro bono,"'8 there is nothing inherent in a
buyout scheme that would cause attorneys to violate the ethical rules.
B. Appointed Counsel in Existing Programs
Private bar associations with mandatory pro bono programs have
not experienced the ethical violations opponents predicted. In 1992
the El Paso Bar Association (EPBA) approved a resolution requiring
all members residing in El Paso County to participate in defending
indigent clients in criminal cases."g EPBA members can file for an
exemption from hands-on service under certain conditions, including
payment of a $600 buyout."s3 The EPBA has 200 to 225 attorneys
who do not choose the exemption and who participate in a court-
appointment program each year." The Council of Judges Adminis-
tration Office, which administrates the appointments, receives fewer
than ten complaints annually from clients who are dissatisfied with
their representation and wish to be reassigned.""
178. Id Rule 6.1 & cmt.
179. Id Rule 6.1 cmt.
180. Id (stating that "there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage
in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility
by providing financial support").
181. Id (stating that "personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can
be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer").
182. El Paso Bar Association, Resolution, at I (Sept. 2, 1992).
183. Id Other exemptions include members who: are over 55 years old; are exempt
by law; are not required to pay the Texas Occupational Tax; or who establish that such
mandatory pro bono would be a hardship. Id.
184. Telephone Interview with Martha Banales, Court Administrator, Council of Judges




The Orange County Bar Association (OCBA) in Florida requires
its members to pay a buyout of $350 or take two pro bono cases per
year86 referred by the Legal Aid Society of the Orange County Bar
Association."' In 1986 the board of trustees of the Legal Aid
Society passed a unanimous motion that outlined their policy on
requests for exemption from accepting Legal Aid Society referral
cases under the mandatory pro bono requirement: "No one is exempt
from service."'" The motion allowed for excusing members for age,
illness, or special circumstances, and also provided ways for full-time
government employees to receive pro bono credit in ways other than
accepting cases."s The motion also stated that those members who
did not fulfill their pro bono obligation should be subject to further
enforcement action.'" Such action, according to the OCBA bylaws,
includes the possible termination of members' OCBA membership if
they are unjustified in their refusal to participate.'91
C. Mandatory Pro Bono Is Not Unethical
The Model Rules will not support a finding that mandatory pro
bono is unethical. Opponents to mandatory pro bono have no basis
in codified ethics for their position. The vague accusation "unethical"
cannot be traced to any violated rule, any canon, any consideration.
This is not to say that there may not be ethical violations that
arise collaterally from mandatory pro bono. If attorneys deliberately
disregard deadlines or fail to prepare adequately for their pro bono
cases they will violate the zealous representation ethical obligation.
There may be attorneys whose dislike of mandatory pro bono makes
them unwilling to undertake reasonable preparation and research
186. Legal Aid Society of the Orange County Bar Association, Preference Form, at 1
(1995).
187. LEGAL AID SOC'Y OF THE ORANGE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, INC., ANNUAL REPORT
1 (1994-1995) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
188. Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Legal Aid Society of the
Orange County Bar Association, at 1 (Aug. 27, 1986) [hereinafter Minutes].
189. Id Government attorneys and corporate counsel participate in the Legal Aid
Society's projects which range from assisting clients in obtaining guardianship for seniors
to advising juveniles accused of misdemeanors to speaking at- community programs.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 187, at 11-12.
190. Minutes, supra note 188, at 1.
191. Bylaws of the Orange County Bar Association, Inc., art. II, § 4(B) (1985) ("The
Executive Council, by majority vote of all members, may terminate the membership of any
member of this Association for the following reasons: . . Unjustified failure to accept
Legal Aid Referral cases.").
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necessary to provide a basic level of competence for their pro bono
clients. But this argument does not belong in the debate about
whether mandatory pro bono programs are unethical. Mandatory
service cannot be blamed for attorneys' choice to let the character of
the work impact the character of their service.
It's time for attorneys and licensing bodies to examine mandatory
pro bono in light of community needs. Certainly any mandatory pro
bono proposal should be carefully inspected for violations of the
ethical rules. However, "why me" arguments ostensibly based in
ethical considerations cannot be given credence in the analysis of
whether the proposed program is ethically sound. As Judge Bellacosa
stated, "The need for legal services is at hand. The duty inures within
the words, spirit and fabric of the [ethical rules], along with copious
other obligations. The quibbling, nibbling and quarreling about
volunteerism versus involuntary servitude and like rhetorical rantings
are silly, embarrassing and counterproductive, and should cease.""
V. CONCLUSION
The SBN's attempt to institute mandatory pro bono acknow-
ledged the indigent population's legal service needs. Even if those
claiming that mandatory pro bono cannot supply enough legal services
are correct, 93 the SBN petition still could have made thousands of
hours available to those with the greatest legal needs. Member
opposition was thus startling and disappointing.
The SBN's withdrawal of its petition showed that it was willing
to rely on members' professed willingness to shoulder voluntarily the
burden of servicing the-poor. In 1997 the SBN will evaluate whether
Nevada attorneys have made good on their promise to provide
voluntary service.' If, despite the resources available to them,
Nevada attorneys have not made significant inroads toward serving
the indigent population, the SBN will decide whether to revisit the
issue of mandatory pro bono.95 Until then, the SBN's revised
approach is pragmatic: it will provide service opportunities to
encourage attorneys not currently involved in pro bono service to
join;196 it will provide opportunities and support for members
192. Bellacosa, supra note 1, at 753 (footnote omitted).
193. Schmitt, supra note 2, at B5.
194. See Forsman, supra note 5, at 14.
195. Telephone Interview with Franny Forsman, supra note 117.
.196. WHAT IS PRO BONO?, supra note 126..
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participating in pro bono programs, including the SBN's Lawyer
Referral and Information Service; and it will provide other opportuni-
ties to acquaint members with the issues encountered in pro bono
work. 97
In the future mandatory pro bono programs may not be as
controversial. In 1993 the ABA strongly recommended that law
schools begin instituting public service requirements.'98 At that time
only a dozen law schools had implemented public service require-
ments. 99 However, as more schools adopt public service require-
ments, new attorneys may find mandatory pro bono-less offensive and
foreign, and twenty hours of annual service may seem less oner-
ous.3w
Attorneys may also be increasingly ready to accept mandatory
service if they have participated in a private bar association with a
mandatory pro bono requirement. The experience of the Orange
County Bar Association shows how members come to embrace the
tradition of serving the community as their own.2° These programs
pave the way for making attorneys more willing to perform service for
the poor. 2
Attorneys may also be more receptive to mandatory programs if
they have participated in reporting systems such as the ones currently
in place in Florida and Texas.' While still in their earliest stages,
197. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
198. Laura Duncan, ABA Retreats on Mandatory Pro Bono Service Requirement for
Graduation, CH. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 13, 1993, at 3.
199. Id. The law student pro bono graduation requirement at the University of
Pennsylvania is 70 hours. Id.
200. See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 2, at 991 (discussing the reasons that the tax burden
of pro bono requirements may be regarded as onerous).
201. Miskiewicz, supra note 160, at 8 (quoting referral coordinator for the Orange
County Legal Aid Society Catherine A. Tucker as saying that mandatory pro bono had
become "status quo").
202. See Stephen T. Maher, No Bono: The Efforts of the Supreme Court of Florida to
Promote the Full Availability of Legal Services, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973, 990 (1987).
203. Julie Oliver, Annual Pro Bono Reporting in Texas and Florida, A.B.A. CENTER
FOR PRO BONO EXCHANGE, Apr. 1995, at 1. Texas's voluntary reporting plan began in
1992 and Florida's mandatory reporting program began in 1994. Id. Texas continues to
reject mandatory reporting because "[m]andatory reporting is just a step away from
mandatory pro bono." Amy Boardman, Board's Pro Bono Filing Drops Again, TEX.
LAW., May 29,1995, at 4 (quoting Jim Branton, outgoing Texas bar president). When the
SBN abandoned the mandatory pro bono petition, it did not implement a system of pro
bono reporting similar to Florida or Texas. Vogel, supra note 7, at 3B (citing SBN
governing board members Cal Dunlap and James Crockett). Members of the governing
board felt that even voluntary reporting would be unproductive, pince it was unlikely that
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these programs have helped state bar associations determine trends
in pro bono service and track changes in the amount of service
available to the indigent population.204 Reporting systems also help
bar associations hone the definition of "pro bono" by learning what
their members believe fits the definition. In addition, reporting helps
educate members about the purpose and nature of public service. °
Future mandatory pro bono programs may also tailor their
provisions in ways the Nevada petition and other proposals have not.
Pro bono requirements may only apply during a certain number of
years of practice or only to those practicing in certain areas of the
law. Alternatively, bar associations may give incentives like continu-
ing legal education vouchers in return for pro bono hours.
°6
Attorneys may be more willing to accept mandatory pro bono under
these conditions.
Nevada attorneys will spend the next year demonstrating their
commitment to the state's indigent population. The SBN expects
member pro bono donations to increase at least moderately. A
successful voluntary program is clearly preferable over a mandatory
plan;2 7 however, when an even moderate level of volunteerism
cannot meet the need, it translates into a plague of unequal jus-
tice--curable by just five minutes of pro bono a day, five days a
week.
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attorneys would admit they had not participated in any pro bono activity. Id.
204. See Oliver, supra note 203, at 12.
205. See Boardman, supra note 203, at 4.
206. See Watkins, supra note 159, at 194.
207. Wachtler, supra note 77, at 743.
208. Wear, supra note 2, at B6.
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